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ABSTRACT: This paper pursues more specifically the recommenda-
tions of a recent National Research Council report recommending
greater attention to research on institutions in the field of water
resource management. The important challenge for the future in
institutional research lies in going beyond the observation that
institutions are important and in explaining instead how institu-
tions actually affect management options and outcomes. It is possi-
ble to illuminate the relationships between institutional features
and water management through comparative institutional
research. This paper offers recommendations for studying water
institutions in a comparative context, including methodological rec-
ommendations concerning approaches to comparative institutional
research, and topics for comparative institutional research that
appear especially fruitful at this time.  The example of conjunctive
management is used to illustrate the importance of institutional
factors in water management, drawing to some extent on the
authors’ recent experience with a comparative study of conjunctive
management institutions.
(KEY TERMS: water resources research; institutional arrange-
ments; water law; water management; social and political; water
policy/regulation/decision making.)
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INTRODUCTION
The National Research Council’s report, “Envision-
ing the Agenda for Water Resources Research in the
Twenty-First Century,” (NRC, 2001, p. 9) acknowl-
edged that “research on institutions occupies only a
very small portion of the current water research agen-
da.” The report recommended “that efforts should be
made to invest relatively more in institutional
research than has been the case in the past” (NRC,
2001, p. 33) and identified some topics on which
greater investments would be beneficial in the Coun-
cil’s view. These included: (1) conduct comparative
studies of water laws and institutions; (2) understand
user organized institutions for water distribution,
such as cooperatives, special districts, and mutual
companies; and (3) develop legal regimes that pro-
mote ground water management and conjunctive use
of surface water and ground water.
In addition to the National Research Council, vari-
ous water management scholars, research institutes,
government agencies, and other practitioner associa-
tions have recognized the importance of institutions
in shaping water management outcomes (Western
States Water Council, 1990; USACIR, 1991; Grigg,
1996; Kenney and Lord, 1999). By identifying and
clarifying the relationship between institutional
arrangements and water management outcomes,
institutional researchers can help advance the larger
goal of improving the sustainable use of water
resources in the United States and elsewhere.
The calls for institutional research and the studies
that identify institutions as important factors shaping
water management are rarely accompanied by 
specific recommendations for how to research and
evaluate the effects of institutions. In this paper addi-
tional and more specific recommendations are offered
for the pursuit of institutional research in water
resources, focusing mainly on the comparative study
of water laws and institutions and user organized
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arrangements. The authors have recently completed a
comparative institutional research project and recom-
mendations reflect some of the ideas developed during
that project and draw upon some examples from it
(Blomquist et al., 2004). Three states in the American
Southwest were studied – Arizona, California, and
Colorado – with substantially different institutional
approaches to the division of state/local leadership
and responsibility for ground water management and
conjunctive water management, and with different
legal regimes governing the use of ground water
resources. These states’ conjunctive management
experiences differ in ways that are linked to those
institutional differences. It is possible to illuminate
the relationships between institutional features and
water management outcomes through this sort of
comparative institutional research.
As a background discussion, a very brief descrip-
tion of the recent study is provided in order to illus-
trate some of the issues that arise in comparative
institutional research regarding water resources, par-
ticularly with respect to conjunctive management.
This paper offers two categories of recommendations
for studying water laws and institutions (including
user organized institutions) in a comparative context.
Methodological recommendations are made concern-
ing approaches to comparative institutional research,
and some topics are recommended for institutional
research that seem to be ripe for fruitful investments
at this time. Through the recommendations for insti-
tutional research, the authors hope to contribute to
the overall goal of building a sound agenda for water
resources research in the 21st Century.
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION: EXPLORING
HOW INSTITUTIONS MATTER IN
A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
Before proceeding to the recommendations, a very
brief synopsis is offered of the comparative institu-
tional study recently completed. This should shed
some light on what institutional arrangements are
and how questions for comparative institutional
research can be framed and addressed with respect to
an important water resource management practice
such as the conjunctive management of surface water
and ground water.
Conjunctive water management has been advocat-
ed in the water management and policy literature for
nearly 60 years as a means of achieving multiple
water management objectives under strong natural
and regulatory constraints (e.g., Conkling, 1946;
Thomas, 1955; Todd and Priestaf, 1997). Conjunctive 
water management involves the coordinated use of
surface water supplies and storage with ground water
supplies and storage. At times when surface water
supplies are comparatively plentiful, conjunctive
water management encourages the direct use of those
surface supplies as well as storing them to the extent
possible behind dams or other impoundment struc-
tures. Ground water basins are tapped less during
these wet periods, allowing them to refill naturally or
through deliberate replenishment efforts. When sur-
face water supplies are comparatively scarce and may
need to be conserved for instream flow needs, stored
ground water can be tapped to supply irrigation or
urban uses. The idea of conjunctive management is
certainly not new, but the practice of conjunctive
management has lagged behind the promise it is
believed to hold.
Institutional factors such as the rules governing
water use and the organizational arrangements for
water management are likely to play important roles
in determining whether, when, and how conjunctive
management programs develop and perform. Institu-
tions facilitate the ease with which multiple actors
interact in complex situations, prescribing what
actions are allowed, required, or forbidden in given
situations (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Thus, insti-
tutions are especially significant when a task requires
coordination. Given the organizational and physical
complexity involved with conjunctive management, it
is likely to require considerable amounts of coordinat-
ed behavior. For instance:
• Surface water facilities, such as dams, reservoirs
and water distribution systems, must be operated in
coordination with ground water supplies, with under-
ground storage capacity, and with the wells and pipes
for ground water conveyance. Each of these facilities
may be owned, operated, or regulated by distinct pub-
lic or private organizations. Each of those organiza-
tions is governed by rules specifying what it may,
must, and must not do. In the United States, those
governing rules may be set at local, state, or national
levels.
• Extensive monitoring of the conjunctive man-
agement operations and of water supply and storage
conditions, and the exchange of information from that
monitoring, are essential to conjunctive management
success.
• Ambient environmental and ecological parame-
ters must be maintained – stream flows and surface
water quality, flood control needs, riparian and aquat-
ic habitat conditions – which are often governed or
monitored by other rules and organizations.
• Environmental impacts can follow from conjunc-
tive management projects, including land subsidence 
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or seawater intrusion from excessive aquifer draw-
down, soil saturation from excessive aquifer replen-
ishment, and migration of contaminants in either
case. These issues may be within the jurisdiction of
the same organizations that operate the facilities for
the conjunctive management program, but often they
are within the jurisdiction of still other (typically pub-
lic) organizations.
In sum, there are institutional issues and effects at
every step in even the simplest of conjunctive man-
agement projects. Those institutional arrangements
can be conducive to success, or they can present sub-
stantial barriers.
The important challenge for the future in institu-
tional research lies in going beyond the observation
that institutions are important. It involves peering
inside the “black box” of institutional processes and
effects, to provide explanations of how institutions
matter – how they prompt people to try to change
management practices, how they ease or hinder those
changes, how they shape the management alterna-
tives water users and organizations consider and
adopt, and how they affect the outcomes that result.
Meeting that goal requires comparative and empirical
institutional analysis. It must be comparative in
order to have a chance of isolating institutional effects
from the myriad of other influences on a water man-
agement regime at any particular place and time. It
must be empirical in order to develop applied knowl-
edge that can provide the foundation for well designed
water management practices and policies. A compara-
tive empirical institutional analysis was the aim as
the effects of institutional arrangements upon con-
junctive management practices and outcomes in Ari-
zona, California, and Colorado were studied
(Blomquist et al., 2001; Blomquist et al., 2004). A com-
bination of document collection, field interviewing,
and data analysis were used to identify the key fea-
tures of water rights institutions and water manage-
ment organizations that shape conjunctive
management.
Water rights were found to affect conjunctive man-
agement in expected and unexpected ways. Poorly or
incompletely specified rights to the use of surface or
ground water have impeded the development of con-
junctive management projects, especially in Califor-
nia. In California, ground water appropriators in a
basin must first define their ground water rights rela-
tive to one another before conjunctive management is
undertaken. In Arizona and Colorado, water users did
not engage in conjunctive management until the leg-
islatures of each state established well defined rights
in ground water.
Property rights that provide individuals or organi-
zations with assurances concerning the storage and
recapture of underground water supplies – which
exist in the Active Management Areas of Arizona, in
some of California’s adjudicated ground water basins,
and in tributary ground water basins in Colorado –
have promoted the establishment of conjunctive man-
agement projects, including some fairly large scale
projects in Arizona and California.
Finding that well defined property rights in ground
water promotes conjunctive management confirms
what analysts have long suspected (e.g., see USACIR,
1991; MacDonnell et.al., 1994); however, well defined
property rights in ground water may result in unan-
ticipated and not entirely desirable consequences. For
instance, given the hydrological connections between
ground and surface water, some scholars have advo-
cated the application of a single property rights
framework in order to give legal recognition to the
physical interactions. If such a framework were in
place in Arizona, ground water pumpers would no
longer be allowed to dry up surface water sources
without being held accountable. Colorado, unlike Ari-
zona or California, incorporated ground water that is
hydrologically connected to a river or stream, also
known as tributary ground water, into the state’s
existing prior appropriation system. The rights of
tributary ground water users are almost universally
junior to surface water rights. Consequently, tribu-
tary ground water users are not allowed to adversely
affect senior water rights, and if they do, they may be
held accountable. Certainly, this was the outcome
that was desired by incorporating tributary ground
water into the prior appropriation doctrine. The
unanticipated and undesirable consequence is that it
has precluded the use of tributary ground water
basins for long term storage and drought manage-
ment. Millions of acre feet of ground water in the
South Platte and Arkansas River Basins cannot be
tapped, even though Colorado is experiencing a
drought, because pumping that water would adverse-
ly affect senior water rights holders. Conjunctive
water management in Colorado is used to protect the
rights of senior water rights holders, which means
supporting surface water flows.
Institutional arrangements that reduce the trans-
action costs of coordinating water users’ acquisition of
supplemental supplies have also facilitated the devel-
opment of conjunctive management projects in Ari-
zona, California, and Colorado. In particular, large
surface water projects have introduced much needed
flexibility because project water is governed by a set
of rights and rules that allow it to be more readily
leased or transferred than water governed by prior
appropriation. Participants in conjunctive manage-
ment projects typically do not acquire rights in native
surface water (which are typically hard to come by
and quite expensive); rather, they contract with the
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owners and operators of large surface projects for sur-
plus water. 
As the complex interaction of institutional arrange-
ments with water management choices were traced, it
became clear that simplified institutional solutions
sometimes envisioned in purely analytical treatments
(e.g., integrated resource management agencies,
water markets) in and of themselves are not likely to
provide many answers to water dilemmas in Arizona,
California, and Colorado and probably not in other
western states. Instead, the policy options that are
suited to conjunctive management, or any other tech-
nique of improved water resource management, must
be applicable to a particular setting. Perhaps ironical-
ly, those characteristics of the particular setting may
become apparent only through comparative analysis
that encourages researchers to notice and address
how one location differs from others.
We discovered that these distinctions included
aspects of the states that had nothing in particular to
do with water resources per se, such as the state’s his-
tory and practices with respect to state/local govern-
ment relations. California and Colorado have “home
rule” traditions of leaving local communities consider-
able latitude to develop their own organizational
arrangements and policies with respect to many other
public services besides the provision and protection of
water supplies. Those traditions are reflected in their
water management practices as well and have influ-
enced the development of conjunctive management in
those states. Arizona has a contrasting tradition as a
nonhome rule state, and that has shaped its water
management approaches as well as its practices with
respect to other public services. Recommendations for
institutional reforms to promote conjunctive manage-
ment in Arizona, California, and Colorado that do not
take into account these long standing aspects of the
states’ political cultures overlook the significant influ-
ence of the broader institutional context within which
water management occurs.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL
RESEARCH IN WATER RESOURCES
If the 21st Century water resources research agen-
da is to include studies comparing water laws and
institutions, and improved understanding of user cre-
ated organizations, it is worth considering how to go
about those tasks. The authors have some recommen-
dations for colleagues who may be undertaking new
studies in these areas soon. These methodological
points are described first, because the authors believe
these methodological matters to be relevant for a
great many topics of institutional research in water
resources. Some topics for institutional research are
described later.
Some Methodological Considerations in Comparative
Institutional Analysis
Selecting Cases for Comparison in Ways That
Help Isolate Institutional Factors – At first blush,
this recommendation seems too obvious to include,
but there is more to isolating institutional factors
than finding cases that differ on the institutional
characteristics of interest (i.e., having enough varia-
tion on the dependent variable). To isolate institution-
al effects, it is also necessary that cases be as similar
to one another as possible on other potentially con-
founding factors. Failing to do so may leave one in a
hopeless muddle where water management outcomes
cannot be attributed to institutional factors or to any
other category of influences, because each case varies
so much from the others on so many dimensions.
Because physical and economic factors matter so
greatly in the development of conjunctive manage-
ment projects, for example, the states of Arizona, Cal-
ifornia, and Colorado were selected for this study
precisely because they bore some similarities to one
another in those respects. All three have arid to semi-
arid conditions, erratic precipitation, substantial geo-
graphic imbalances between the location of abundant
water supply and the locations of greatest demand,
significant growth and urbanization pressures, and
higher levels of economic development than most of
their neighboring southwestern states. This is cer-
tainly not meant to overlook their differences on these
and other dimensions. It is rather to say that these
three states had greater similarities to one another
than they had to other cases on these dimensions,
while differing substantially with respect to their
water laws and institutions. Without guaranteeing us
any results or success, the selection of cases created
at least the possibility for a comparative institutional
analysis where the institutional differences had a
chance of standing out among the many other factors
that influence water management practices.
Choosing cases that are similar in physical and
economic conditions but differ on institutional vari-
ables of interest also helps provide an alternative
approach to the “induced institutions” work that has
appeared in the natural resource management litera-
ture in the past, including water management litera-
ture in particular (Demsetz, 1967; Anderson and Hill,
1983). That view, which posits that institutional
changes are epiphenomena of resource scarcity, is use-
ful and provocative, but the comparative institutional
analysis field also needs studies where resource
scarcity conditions were similar but institutions
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developed differently anyway, in order to probe the
origins and effects of institutions in additional useful
ways.
For comparative institutional analysis, selection of
cases is arguably more important than the number of
cases (Scharpf, 1997; Agrawal, 2002). (The number of
cases is likely to be limited in comparative institu-
tional analysis anyway. This tends to be time consum-
ing and labor intensive research, and particularly for
cross state or cross national comparisons, the number
of cases is constrained automatically.) For example, a
study of water transfers with a dozen cases of com-
pleted transactions and a dozen cases of failed trans-
actions, but where the cases also differ substantially
on several dimensions apart from the institutional
variables of interest, may yield fewer useful results
than a study of half a dozen cases where the institu-
tional variables represented the greatest distinctions
among the cases. In this research on conjunctive man-
agement, observations were limited to three states,
but still had substantial diversity of conjunctive man-
agement projects, variation among organizations
involved in conjunctive management, and different
rules within states from which to draw valuable com-
parisons.
In addition, some consideration must be given to
whether the institutional variables highlighted in the
cases will be appropriate for addressing the institu-
tional questions of interest. The selection of cases
should be guided by theory and there are several tra-
ditions that may be drawn upon to develop theoreti-
cally rich institutional questions. Economists, for
instance, have begun to broaden their focus beyond
examining comparative performance of well specified
private property rights in water to identifying and
examining the efficiency effects of key institutional
features, from different water allocation rules (Ben-
nett et al., 2000), to examining the effects of specific
legal, policy, and administrative arrangements on the
performance of water organizations (Saleth and
Dinar, 1999). Legal scholars have just begun to 
attend to questions of concerning the challenges of 
incorporating watershed level and ecosystem level
governance in the existing framework of U.S. environ-
mental laws and regulations (Karkkainen, 2002). The
multidisciplinary field of common pool resources
offers numerous hypotheses, from the interaction of
different resource features on self-governance, to the
effects of the larger economic and social context on
local governance of common pool resources (Ostrom
et al., 2002). Or, more specifically, the Natural
Resources Law Center has produced a series of
descriptive studies of watershed initiatives that raise
a number of interesting issues, such as the compara-
tive performance of traditional and collaborative man-
agement approaches, the effects of consensus decision
making on the quality of decisions, and actions that
may be taken to improve the performance of water-
shed collaborations (Natural Resources Law Center,
1998; Kenney, 2000; Kenney et al., 2000). A consider-
able challenge for comparative institutional work on
water is not a lack of cases, but the wealth of theoreti-
cally compelling, policy pertinent questions that beg
for careful testing.
Studying Cases Where Water Policy Reforms
Are Being or Have Recently Been Attempted –
Institutional arrangements play multiple roles in
water management practices, as in other human
endeavors. One role is of rules in use, guiding well
established or even routine patterns of action or inter-
action. Such rules in use shape water management
choices such as whether or not a water provider is
able to acquire excess surface water for underground
storage in a conjunctive management project, or
whether or not a water provider may readily access
water stored underground. Institutions guide day to
day activities and choices.
Institutional arrangements also shape the decision
situations that people face as they contemplate
changing their day to day actions or interactions, and
as such constrain or facilitate what people can do to
adopt and implement new water management prac-
tices.
How institutions structure and constrain potential
water management actions and strategies provides
opportunities to gain substantial advances of knowl-
edge concerning the influence of institutions. Compar-
ative studies of situations in which changes in water
management activities (e.g., conjunctive manage-
ment, water reuse, water transfers, watershed man-
agement, etc.) are being or have been attempted can
maximize researchers’ opportunities to capture
whether, why, and how institutional arrangements
affected people’s ability to accomplish management
reforms. The study of conjunctive water management
practices looked across states and within states at dif-
ferent points of water policy reform to assess such
impacts. Recent institutional changes in Arizona, for
example, establishing rights to ground water in
Active Management Areas, ensuring rights to store
and recover artificially recharged water in these
regions, and creating state sponsored organizations to
facilitate the acquisition and delivery of surface sup-
plies for recharge have most certainly facilitated the
proliferation of conjunctive water management pro-
grams across Arizona’s municipal and agricultural
users over the past decade.
This is the understanding of institutional effects
that researchers in the water resources field need to
clarify more often. A number of policy recommenda-
tions, particularly for improving water use efficiency,
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION 929 JAWRA
BUILDING AND AGENDA FOR INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH IN WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
have been reiterated for decades in the professional
literature (Ingram et al., 1984; Lord, 1984; El-Ashry
and Gibbons, 1986; Reisner and Bates, 1990; Liv-
ingston, 1993; Anderson and Snyder, 1997; Haddad,
2000). This literature is valuable for promoting
improved management techniques, but only occasion-
ally addresses more squarely the choices and implica-
tions of institutional arrangements. Thus, this
literature helps us understand the importance of
institutions, but does not go far enough in explaining
what institutional features work well under different
settings or how certain rule arrangements are shaped
by particular environments. 
It is necessary to understand better, deeper, and
more thoroughly, through comparative analyses of
existing institutions, how water laws, rules in use,
and management organizations aid, hinder, and alter
the adoption of water policy reforms – which are
themselves changes of institutional arrangements.
Such an improved understanding would represent a
significant advance toward the broader goal of under-
standing institutions and their effects in water
resource management generally.
Attending to the Levels of Action –  As the pre-
ceding point states, understanding institutions neces-
sarily and importantly includes understanding
institutional change. A methodological point that aris-
es at this juncture is the significance of consciously
and deliberately incorporating the notion of “levels of
action” (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982) into comparative
institutional analysis. This is critical to advancing the
understanding of institutional arrangements general-
ly in the water resources field and of user created
organizations in particular.
Institutional arrangements function at an opera-
tional level of action to guide the ordinary actions of
individuals and organizations primarily through
determining which actions are allowed, required, or
forbidden at which junctures for which categories of
individuals. But these operational rules are them-
selves made at another, collective choice level of
action, where a different set of rules specifies who
may undertake rule changes and what sorts of
changes are allowed, required, or forbidden under dif-
ferent circumstances. Those collective choice rules are
set at a constitutional level of action.
The levels of action concept makes explicit the
recognition that institutional rules do not merely
exist and guide individuals’ behavior, but also may be
changed (and even the rules about who can change
the rules can be changed). Awareness of the possibili-
ty of action beyond the operational level can help
institutional researchers move beyond mere assess-
ments of the effects of existing rules – assessments
that treat the institutional rules in use at a particular
time and place as “given.” Getting beyond the “given”-
ness of institutions is essential for understanding how
institutional arrangements really work, since people’s
reactions to and cooperation with rules and organiza-
tions will often reflect their perceptions of the pro-
cesses by which those rules were adopted or could be
changed.
For instance, for over 150 years in Colorado the
contents of the prior appropriation doctrine and its
implementation have been developed by water rights
holders working closely with water courts. Rules con-
cerning diversions, beneficial use, and transfers,
among many others, have been devised and revised as
water users challenge one another and attempt to
protect their rights in the context of a water court – a
collective choice arena. Among water users, water
courts are viewed as the legitimate collective choice
arena for devising water rights and rules. This
became especially apparent after the Colorado legisla-
ture granted the State Engineer the authority to
devise water regulations. In other words, the Engi-
neer was granted the authority to engage in the col-
lective choice activity of rule making. The first time
the Engineer used this authority water users immedi-
ately challenged the rules in water court. Eventually,
the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Engineer
indeed had the authority to devise rules but had
improperly exercised that authority (Vranesh, 1987).
Since that finding, the State Engineer has worked
more closely with water users in the development of
rules and submits those rules to the proper water
court to be adjudicated (Simpson, 2002).
The levels of action conception is particularly
important for research on user created organizations.
Absent an awareness of the levels of action, it is diffi-
cult to make sense of user created organizations in
the water resources field or in other aspects of life.
User created organizations just seem to appear (or
perhaps are “induced” by resource conditions), and
researchers may see the prospects for organizational
innovation or change lying only outside the user
group itself – as having to come from larger jurisdic-
tions, for example. Keeping the levels of action in
mind when designing institutional research in water
resources is a way of reminding oneself to look upon
the origins and transformations of institutional
arrangements as matters of deliberation and choice
that may have been undertaken by the users them-
selves (or by or in concert with others), which pro-
vides a different sort of understanding of institutions’
and the users’ roles in the management of the
resource (Blomquist, 1992; Ostrom et al., 1994).
Indeed, without the concept of levels of action the oft-
mentioned notion of “governance” in water resources
is likely to be murky and mis-specified at best.
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Minding the Intergovernmental Relations
Context – Levels of action are not the same as levels
of government. Levels of action center on rules and
rule making activity, which can occur in a single orga-
nization or across multiple organizations. Levels of
government center on local, regional, state, federal,
tribal, and international organizations and the rela-
tionships among them. Intergovernmental relations
are sets of institutional arrangements that further
define who can do what under which conditions. Such
relationships often contribute mightily, but in non-
obvious or overlooked ways, to water management
practices. Researchers undertaking institutional
studies in the water resources field would do well,
then, to be sure to take account of the intergovern-
mental relations context of the settings of their stud-
ies.
Intergovernmental relations are at the core of
many significant institutional changes that have
redefined the water landscape over the past two
decades in the U.S.  Federal agencies are both more
and less central to numerous water issues. The feder-
al water agencies such as the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Army Corps of Engineers have seen their con-
struction budgets decline precipitously over the past
two decades. Both agencies have struggled to redefine
their roles and their relationships with other govern-
ments and agencies in the federal universe. Converse-
ly, federal agencies such as the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice administering major environmental legislation
find themselves more involved in water issues.
States, too, have found their water roles expanding
as water settings rapidly change. Historically, states
and states’ water laws have governed the allocation
and use of water within their borders, but now states
are increasingly active in interstate water transfers.
While some states are actively searching for water
outside of their borders, others are attempting to pro-
tect their waters from being transported to other
states. States have also become more active in water
quality issues as they take on the permitting process-
es defined by federal water quality acts. But just as
states are expanding their water powers and activi-
ties they are also realizing the limits of their authori-
ty. For instance, Indian tribes have begun asserting
their claims to water and enforcing their water rights
against states and nontribal water users. Indian
water claims have revealed the neglect on the part of
states and the limits on state authority to reign in
non-Indian water uses. States’ authority to adequate-
ly manage water within their boundaries has also
been challenged by actions to enforce river compacts.
Some states, such as Colorado, have begun to realize
that they can only meet their compact obligations if 
they work closely with local water users to bring
water use within the limits set by compacts. 
Furthermore, local citizens are pushing against
states and federal agencies to open governing spaces
for themselves. Collaborative efforts around water-
sheds, forests, and other ecosystems are rapidly
emerging as resource users search for alternatives to
the command and control approaches of federal envi-
ronmental laws (Kenney and Lord, 1999).
While it is virtually impossible to identify a com-
pelling water issue or setting that does not include an
intergovernmental component, intergovernmental
relations and interactions are worthy subjects of
research in and of themselves. Recent changes involv-
ing California’s use of Colorado River water provide
an example. Although much attention has been
focused on the direct water management effects of
those changes, they are unfolding in a context shaped
by federal/state, interstate, and state/local relations.
The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) mandated
California to devise a plan by December 31, 2002, to
reduce its use of Colorado River water by about
800,000 acre feet a year. California had been using as
much as 20 percent more than its allocation of Col-
orado River water, a practice begun long ago when
Arizona and Nevada were not yet using their full
allotments. California’s preparations for reducing its
reliance involved some conjunctive management and
water transfer agreements among local entities, the
most controversial of which was the proposed transfer
of about 200,000 acre feet per year from the Imperial
Irrigation District to commercial and residential
users in San Diego for 75 years. Some Imperial Valley
farmers felt that the water transfer price was too low,
other opponents felt that reduced irrigation would
cause increased dust pollution in the valley, and oth-
ers feared the liability consequences of reduced irriga-
tion runoff to the Salton Sea. A breakdown in
negotiations over this transfer made it impossible for
California to comply with its deadline for the plan.
In response, the Secretary of the Interior took the
unprecedented step of cutting allocations to California
by nearly 600,000 acre feet per year, a large portion of
which was taken from the Imperial Irrigation Dis-
trict’s supplies. Imperial Irrigation District sued the
DOI, arguing for restoration of its portion of the cuts.
The state of California, the federal government, the
other six Colorado River states, and the local water
agencies scrambled for months to piece together
another deal. In the fall of 2003, the parties finally
negotiated the Quantification Settlement Agreement,
which includes the San Diego/Imperial transfer, once
assurances had been received concerning Salton Sea
preservation efforts and additional financial support
for water conservation measures in the Imperial Val-
ley.
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The relationships among the various local, state,
and federal agencies in this recent battle are clearly
important for understanding the operational and
organizational outcomes that will ensue. Researchers
interested in comparing the institutions governing
the Colorado River basin with other multi-state
basins should pay close attention to these intergov-
ernmental arrangements.
Topics for Further Institutional Research in Water
Resources At This Time
There are several important institutional topics in
the water management field that appear to be ripe for
intensive comparative empirical research. As each is
described briefly, some research questions that insti-
tutional analysts could pursue are suggested.
Property Rights and Water Policy Reforms –
There have been plenty of conceptual and analytical
treatments of property rights issues with respect to
natural resource management generally and water in
particular. Somewhat less common have been compar-
ative empirical studies of the effects of differences in
water use rights on water management practices,
water policy reforms, and outcomes. The actual rela-
tionships between property rights and water policy
reforms (such as conjunctive management, watershed
management, water markets, and water reuse) strike
us as especially worthwhile at this moment, because
there are some abstract propositions in the literature
that comparative empirical research may help clarify.
On the one hand, many scholars expect that incom-
plete or poorly specified property rights will inhibit
water users’ investments in beneficial and cooperative
projects, including conservation. Water users who
doubt their ability to capture the benefits of restraint
or investment will be less likely to make sacrifices in
the short run for longer term sustainability. Further-
more, with specific regard to conjunctive manage-
ment, dual or multiple property rights systems – such
as one set of rules for surface water and another for
ground water – increase the transaction costs of
reaching agreements among water users and imple-
menting projects. Empirical studies of water markets
concur, suggesting that complex water rights regimes
can play an important role in raising the transaction
costs for water storage and transfer (see e.g., Howe,
1997; Haddad, 2000).
On the other hand, some of the literature on
ecosystem management and complex adaptive sys-
tems has contended that use rights which are speci-
fied too rigidly (e.g., fixed quotas) may be a barrier 
to the sort of adaptive management best suited to 
complex systems under conditions of uncertainty (Wil-
son, 2002; Rose, 2002). Water policy reforms such as
conjunctive management and integrated watershed
management require a certain amount of flexibility
within and among water uses over time as conditions
change. Among the most productive conjunctive man-
agement projects studied, for example, were ones
where water managers could switch relatively easily
(and could encourage water users to switch relatively
easily) between surface water and ground water in
order to maximize availability, minimize cost, and
respond to changing resource conditions.
These differing ideas concerning the impacts of
property rights systems on the implementation and
success of certain water policy reforms suggest to us
that the examination of property rights and their
relation to such reforms is an area ripe for further
comparative institutional analysis. The interesting
questions are already out in the open in the analytical
literature. To articulate more helpful and better sup-
ported policy recommendations concerning property
rights reforms, it is necessary to know what actual
experiences can offer.
Organizational Fragmentation and Coordina-
tion – There can be little question that water
resource management responsibilities are divided
among and exercised by several jurisdictions, even
within a location such as a metropolitan area or a
watershed. Most commonly remarked is the fact that
water supply management and water quality protec-
tion are typically handled by separate organizations,
but that is hardly the end of it. Ground water man-
agement and surface water management are separat-
ed in many locations, as are water and wastewater
management, land use and water management, pub-
lic health and water management, and environmental
protection and water management.
In the water resources literature, however, these
organizational separations are typically addressed
either through generalized condemnations of frag-
mentation and calls for integration (e.g., Loucks,
2003; Stakhiv, 2003), or through anecdotes about how
some particular aspect of water resource management
worked out (or did not) in a particular community at a
particular moment. Another forum in which such
matters are addressed spasmodically is in “Little
Hoover Commission” reports, which often amount to
little more than cataloging of the numbers of agencies
that exist, followed by critical remarks about how
untidy all of this is. Predictable policy solutions often
follow: integrate all aspects of water management,
preferably at the watershed level (Natural Resources
Law Center, 1998).
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What is needed, and largely missing to date, is
comparative and empirical analyses of actual settings
with varying degrees of institutional and organiza-
tional diversity. The purposes of such studies would
be to penetrate to empirical questions such as: (a)
whether and how diverse organizations relate to and
represent different constituencies; (b) the extent and
effectiveness of communication, information sharing,
and coordination among organizations with water-
related responsibilities; or, conversely, (c) how much
conflict occurs among them; and finally, (d) whether
more integrated systems perform better. Such studies
require recognition of the functional distinctions
among organizations in addition to their geographical
overlap. In other words, whether two or more water-
related management functions are sufficiently dis-
tinct in terms of needed skills and expertise,
economies of scale, etc., that the benefits of specializa-
tion outweigh the incremental costs of interorganiza-
tional coordination. Heikkila (2001) has made a
serious effort to tackle some of these topics with
respect to conjunctive management in a number of
settings, and Easter and Hearne (1995) provided an
assessment of decentralized arrangements and effi-
ciency in a number of contexts, but there are few
other examples to point out. The authors are con-
vinced that the data for such studies can be gathered
and analyzed, and the studies themselves could pro-
duce timely and beneficial results that would aid
water resource professionals in moving beyond
abstractions and anecdotes when they discuss organi-
zational issues.
User Created Organizations in the Watershed
– As the National Research Council report recom-
mended, the entire issue of user created water
resource organizations warrants a great deal of addi-
tional institutional research. There are a number of
questions about user created organizations that are
worth asking and pursuing through institutional
research.
There is the question of the collective action barri-
ers that must be surmounted in order for such organi-
zations to come into existence, which can be studied
across enough cases at this point to develop some
interesting and worthwhile knowledge on that score.
A related question involves the role of other jurisdic-
tions (particularly larger jurisdictions such as a state
or national government) in allowing, promoting, or
even mandating the creation of user organizations
(Natural Resources Law Center, 1998). Since many
user created organizations are nongovernmental
(water user associations, watershed forums, etc.), the
question of how nongovernmental organizations can
and do perform governance functions would be worthy
of pursuit and likely to yield interesting findings.
Last but not least, and closely related to the topic of
“Organizational Fragmentation and Coordination,”
there is the matter of interorganizational and/or
intergovernmental arrangements – whether and how
user created organizations relate to other existing pri-
vate and public organizations connected with water
resource management in particular settings.
The field of watershed management presents espe-
cially strong opportunities currently for the study of
the questions above concerning user created organiza-
tions. Lubell et al. (2002) recently reported analyses
of data on watershed partnerships in the United
States, with a particular focus on the conditions
under which the barriers to collective action in the
formation of such partnerships were overcome. Moore
and Koontz (2003) offer a classification of types of
watershed groups based on their principal member-
ship and suggest that different types of groups have
different primary goals or orientations. These studies
demonstrate the ripeness of this field of inquiry. Com-
parable or followup studies could zero in on questions
such as the influence of state and/or federal incen-
tives on the established of watershed organizations
and whether watershed organizations that were
formed with (or in response to) state or federal fund-
ing have fared any differently than organizations
established independently of such incentives. The
Natural Resources Law Center has provided an
invaluable handbook for researchers who are consid-
ering exploring these issues (Kenney et al., 2000).
Questions such as these, in addition to the ques-
tions of nongovernmental governance arrangements
and interorganizational arrangements, are ripe to be
explored in the watershed context right now in the
U.S. The answers could provide a strong addition to
the field of institutional research in water resources
at the outset of the 21st Century.
Public Participation, or Water User Participa-
tion – The watershed management and ecosystem
management literatures, the water reuse and risk
perception literatures, the water conservation and
water use efficiency literature, share a common and
consistent theme – the importance of public participa-
tion generally, or water users’ participation in partic-
ular. The authors do not doubt the underlying logic
that urges the importance of participation. But any
time such a prescription is being stated, repeated, and
taken for granted, it seems to be the role of the con-
trary researcher to ask some questions.
The public participation/user participation mantra
fairly cries out for some comparative empirical
research. It is worth asking, for knowledge’s own sake
and for the practical benefits of informing water man-
agement practices, whether and in what ways partici-
pation makes a difference. Such questions are being
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explored by examining different processes or mecha-
nisms used to include public input into environmental
decision making (Allen, 1998; Wernstedt and Hersh,
1998). A rich, primarily single case study literature
has emerged that examines: (1) participants’ percep-
tions of fairness (Lauber and Knuth, 1999; Selin and
Carr, 2000); (2) specific factors, such as resources, on
the efficacy of citizen participation (Busenburg, 2000);
and (3) the performance of different participation
methods in terms of specific outcome measures such
as participant understanding of the issues, or the
quality of environmental plans (McComas and Scher-
er, 1999; Burroughs, 1999).
This case study literature has provided a solid
foundation for understanding the different forms of
public participation. What is largely missing are insti-
tutional considerations, particularly how the larger
institutional context affects public participation pro-
cesses (Burroughs, 1999), and how public participa-
tion processes affect water management outcomes
and the sustainability of institutional arrangements
themselves. Such approaches stand good chances of
offering some research basis for maintaining and
expanding or for questioning, the ubiquitous empha-
sis on public and user participation.
CONCLUSION
Twenty years ago, Ingram and colleagues published
an article titled “Guidelines for Improved Institution-
al Analysis in Water Resources Planning” (Ingram et
al., 1984). The motivation for the paper was the
dearth of institutional analyses under girding most
water resources planning and evaluation efforts
(Ingram et al., 1984, p. 324). The authors identified
and illustrated, using water development examples,
the steps and factors involved in conducting rigorous
policy analyses (Lasswell, 1971; DeLeon, 1997). Ana-
lysts must clearly define the problem, the actors and
their stakes, the various resources that actors have at
their disposal to attempt to protect and realize their
interests, the various decision arenas and their acces-
sibility and biases towards different actors, and the
strategies that actors may use in realizing their inter-
ests. Such analyses are likely to provide more com-
plete explanations of problems and the effects and
consequences of different policy solutions, such as
various market mechanisms, changes in water laws,
changes in federal water management practices, and
so forth. Most importantly, the authors argue, such
hard nosed assessments will make important contri-
butions to improving water governance because they 
will explain “how human beings are likely to behave 
and not how we might hope they would behave”
(Ingram et al., 1984, p. 333).
Today, this policy analysis approach is reflected in
the institutional analysis efforts of water economists
Saleth and Dinar (1999). Their motivation is similar
to that of Ingram and colleagues: to address the
“lamentable dearth of understanding on the issue of
how to affect water institutional change” (1999, p.
vii). They propose an analytic framework that echoes
the guidelines developed by Ingram et al. (1984).
Saleth and Dinar (1999) carefully identify legal, poli-
cy, and administrative features common to most
water settings, the relationships among these fea-
tures, and how they affect the performance of water
organizations. The framework, much like the Ingram
et al. (1984) guidelines, is meant to assist analysts in
designing more effective water management policies.
Also see Kenney and Lord (1999) for a natural
resources framework that is based on the work of
Kiser and Ostrom (1982) and Ostrom et al. (1994).
The methodological and substantive recommenda-
tions made in this paper build on, but are distinct
from, the work of Ingram et al. (1984) and Saleth and
Dinar (1999). Guidelines or a framework that ana-
lysts may use to engage in high quality institutional
analyses are not provided herein; that work has
already been capably done. The starting point for this
work begins, in some sense, where the guidelines and
frameworks end. A capacity to engage in rigorous
institutional analysis is assumed. The suggestions
herein attempt to direct that capacity to particularly
rich institutional questions using appropriate
methodological approaches.
Kenney and Lord (1999, p. 99) note that there is “a
growing desire among many parties in the natural
resources community to bring a greater level of scien-
tific scrutiny to the description, analysis and, ulti-
mately, the design of institutional arrangements.”
The focus here has been on a few methodological and
substantive topics that the authors think bring a
greater level of scientific scrutiny to the design of
institutional arrangements and that could yield use-
ful results at present to help us redress the National
Research Council’s concern that the nation has not
been “learning as much as we might” from current
experience.  Even the few topics suggested herein rep-
resent formidable additions to the agenda for institu-
tional research in water resources.
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